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I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional guarantees, regardless of how profound, are not absolute.I The
history of fundamental rights and liberties, from the first through the fourteenth
amendment, is replete with instances of limitation, condition, and circumscription.
Although deviation from or qualification of fundamental norms is not necessarily
problematical when justifications are weighty and principled, 2 judicial line-drawing
that is perceived as fitful, capricious, or poorly linked to pertinent values is likely to
be both institutionally and constitutionally demeaning. Supreme Court review,
pursuant to the first amendment's establishment clause, may not reflect the original
miscalculations characterizing other constitutional ignominies such as slavery, 3
segregation, 4 and Lochnerism.5 Still, the construction and execution of standards fail
to satisfy even minimal expectations of persuasive and creditable analysis. They are
dishonored in word, by critics who regard their inconsistencies as an embarrassment, 6
and in deed, by exponents who apply them erratically 7 or simply dispense with them
when convenience beckons. 8
The establishment clause, in theory, makes religion irrelevant to political
standing and guards against directly or indirectly coerced association with religion. 9
Modern analysis of relationships between church and state essentially consists of a
three-part test focusing upon purpose, effect, and entanglement. Government action
supposedly crosses the establishment clause if not occasioned by a secular motive, if
construed as officially endorsing or disparaging religion, or if the government action
would ensnare the separate machinery of church and state.' 0 The elements of this
tripartite formula have bred dissonance and betrayed analytical weakness. Assess-
ment of intent implicates the vanities of motive-based inquiry." The focus upon
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1. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
2. Freedom of expression, for instance, may be curtailed or denied altogether when the Court considers regulatory
interest to be significant enough. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (commercial expression may be regulated to ensure unimpaired flow of truthful information);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447-48 (1969) (political expression may be regulated if imminent unlawful conduct
is likely); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is unprotected expression).
3. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
4. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
5. The term "Lochnerism" refers to the Court's construction of contractual freedom as a fundamental liberty
secured by the fourteenth amendment and unbending use of it to invalidate economic and social reforms during the first
third of this century. See L. TRBE, A~tastcAN CONSMTrUnONAL LAW 438-42 (1978).
6. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. See infra notes 26-51 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
9. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. See id. at 688; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
11. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
effect has engendered appraisal that too often is insensitive to or unmindful of
reality.12 Consideration of whether government and religion would become unduly
intertwined has suffered from calculated neglect and at times has functioned
surreptitiously as a balancing test.13
Given the inscrutable lessons of accumulated case law and consequent unpre-
dictability of result, it is not surprising that some members of the Court have sought
out or advanced alternative analytical methodologies. Unfortunately, what has
surfaced from the intellectual morass so far is no less disquieting than prevailing
doctrine. Former Chief Justice Burger devised an accommodation concept that the
Court relied upon in upholding the use of chaplains to open legislative proceedings. 14
The principle also contributed toward validation of a government sponsored nativity
scene.15 Meanwhile, Chief Justice Rehnquist has challenged the foundational premise
that the establishment clause creates a wall between government and religion. 16 He
thus maintains that the Constitution requires official neutrality among religions but
not between religion and irreligion. 17 Neither the accommodation precept nor the
proposed demolishing or restructuring of the wall between church and state, however,
affords attractive options. Accommodation would breed results no more principled
than those which are obtained now, albeit perhaps in a less convoluted way.' 8
Rehnquist's notions reflect a reading of history that is at best selective, at worst
disingenuous, and in either event flawed. 19
The guarantee against enactment of laws "respecting an establishment of
religion" 20 was formulated to ensure that the republic would not fractionate and
founder upon religious differences. Too frequently, it is difficult to discern how
establishment clause review meaningfully pertains to the proposition's reason for
existence. Reasoning and conclusions, moreover, routinely seem oblivious to or
heedless of the link between the establishment clause and cultural pluralism. At least
three justices are on record in favor of reexamining existing standards2 1 and one
justice has sharply criticized the operation of these standards at least in part.22
Because the future of the three-part test seems increasingly unsettled, consideration
of potential doctrinal alternatives is especially timely. The purpose of this Article is
to: (1) delineate the woeful nature of modern establishment clause thinking; (2)
explain why alternative analytical methodologies that the Court is experimenting with
or pondering are at least as unattractive; and (3) identify some focal points that might
12. See infra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
14. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
15. Thus, the Court observed that a municipality's nativity scene has principally taken note of a significant
historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676-78, 686 (1984).
16. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 113.
18. See infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 123-51 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
21. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 91
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2593 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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contribute to more principled and meaningful review better attuned to the needs of
cultural pluralism and thus the broader interests and values of the first amendment.
II. THE AMAZING DISGRACE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Court's first significant effort to chart the contours of the establishment
clause was a harbinger of future calamity. In Everson v. Board of Education,23 the
Court considered a constitutional challenge to transportation reimbursements for
parents of children in public and parochial schools. 24 Justice Black, after examining
early American concerns that prompted the framing, adoption, and ratification of the
establishment clause, concluded that the first amendment
means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and State." 25
The cogency of Black's explication was embraced by the entire Court. Four
justices dissented from the judgment upholding the subsidy scheme, however, on
grounds that approval deviated from the Court's stringent characterization of the first
amendment. 26 A sense that strict separation of church and state was merely being
mouthed moved Justice Jackson to observe that "the case which irresistibly comes to
mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to Byron's reports,
"whispering 'I will ne'er consent'-consented. "27 The Court's first accession was
not its last, although future oscillations between consent and demurral moved beyond
a singular fall from doctrinal purity into what has become a prolonged wallowing in
disrepute.
Most decisions implicating the establishment clause have concerned government
assistance to parochial schools. In addition to allowing state reimbursement of student
transportation expenses, 2s the Court has countenanced textbook loans, 29 tax deduc-
tions for educational costs, 30 government funding of standardized testing, 31 subsi-
dized physical and psychological diagnostic services and counseling, 32 and publicly
23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
26. See id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 46 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Board of Edue. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-48 (1968).
30. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983).
31. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
32. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244, 248 (1977).
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financed construction at sectarian colleges. 33 The Court has invalidated, however,
loans of instructional materials to parochial schools, 34 government-provided field trip
transportation, 35 tax credits for educational CoStS, 36 teacher salary supplements, 37
reimbursement for non-standardized testing, 38 and special educational programs for
students and adults. 39
Other significant controversies have related to the presentation, promotion, or
facilitation of religious theory or values in public schools, public deliberative bodies,
the workplace, and on government property. Released time programs have been
upheld to the extent religious education is provided off40 but not on campus. 4'
Official efforts to ban the theory of evolution from the schoolhouse, 42 or require
instruction in creationism if evolution is taught,43 have been invalidated. School
prayer, 44 Bible readings, 45 and classroom religious displays have also been
invalidated, 46 although a moment of silence that could be devoted to prayer at student
discretion may be permissible. 47 The use of chaplains to lead prayer in legislative or
other deliberative bodies, 48 Sunday blue laws, 49 and government subsidized nativity
scenes5o have withstood establishment clause scrutiny, but legislation affording
employees a right not to work on their chosen day of worship has not.5 1
The variable results in the establishment clause cases reflect more finesse than
congruity of thought. Dissenting opinions alternately shriek allegations that the Court
has substituted subjective preferences for settled establishment clause principles 52 or
that the Court has taken those precepts too far. 53 The vacillations and inconsistencies
responsible for the sorry state of establishment clause review have been well-
documented from a macrocosmic perspective.5 4 The fickle nature of the Court's
analysis is even more graphic when the operation of its standards are examined from
a microcosmic viewpoint. The recent case of Bowen v. Kendrick55 is a prominent
33. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 766-67 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 689 (1971).
34. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 251.
35. Id. at 254-55.
36. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973).
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
38. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1980).
39. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985).
40. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
41. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
42. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
43. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2584 (1987).
44. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433 (1962).
45. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
46. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980).
47. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
48. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
49. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961).
50. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
51. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985).
52. See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 813-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prr. L. REv.
673 (1980).
55. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
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example of how establishment clause review is a labyrinth characterized by multiple
exit points.
In the Kendrick case, the Court determined that federal funding of religious
organizations which counseled teenagers against premarital sex and abortion, 56 at
least on its face, did not breach the establishment clause. 57 Since its enactment in
1981, the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA")5 8 has allocated more than $100
million to religious groups including Roman Catholic agencies.5 9 Despite arguments
and trial court findings that the AFLA underwrote religious indoctrination, 6o the
Court found no violation of the three-part test for an establishment clause violation. 61
Like many establishment clause decisions, the Kendrick opinion illustrates the
futility of motive-based inquiry. Even if religious reasons motivated some legislators
to support the AFLA, an ample array of secular reasons could be articulated to
obscure wrongful intent. 62 The need to discern official intent is as troubling a
dimension of establishment clause thinking as it is in other areas of constitutional law.
Wrongful intent, for instance, is a prerequisite for demonstrating not just an
establishment clause violation, 63 but also for proving a claim of race or gender
discrimination. 64 The Court's pursuit of motive-based inquiry is not only treacherous,
but mystifying, given its acknowledgement of the perils of such analysis. In freedom
of speech cases, the Court has refused to assess official motive65 because such intent
is so elusive. 66 Especially because the rationales of individual legislators may diverge
even when their votes are identical, the Court concluded, in United States v.
O'Brien,67 that "stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork" when first
amendment interests are implicated. 68
Given recognition of the dangers and deficiencies of motive-based inquiry, the
Court's selective subscription to it is inexplicable. It is disquieting, moreover, to the
extent that such a burdensome standard favors majoritarian interests and encumbers
vindication of minority concerns and cultural pluralism. Rightfully so, the need to
identify wrongful intent to establish race or sex discrimination has been extensively
and effectively criticized. 69
Concern with impeding the functions of the legislative branch, even if arguably
valid in equal protection settings where any classification having a disparate racial or
56. Id. at 2566-68 & nn. 1-3.
57. Id. at 2579.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 300Z-300Z-10 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
59. See Christian Sci. Monitor. June 30, 1988. at 40, col. 2.
60. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2568.
61. Id. at 2570-79.
62. See infra notes 65-68. 71-72, 142-44 and accompanying text.
63. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2579.
64. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252. 265 (1977).
65. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
66. See id.
67. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
68. Id. at 384.
69. See, e.g., Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STrA.
L. REV. 317, 319 (1987).
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gender impact may be problematical, 70 is less persuasive when considering the issue
of church and state relationships. The inaptness of motive-based inquiry in the
establishment clause context has been effectively noted by Justice Scalia. Reciting
many of the same criticisms directed toward modern equal protection analysis, Scalia
notes that identification of motive is an "almost. . .impossible task.' '71
The number of possible motivations to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even
finite .... [A] particular legislator need not have voted for [a law] either because he wanted
to foster religion or because he wanted to improve education. He may have thought the bill
would provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction of
his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have been a close friend of the bill's
sponsor, or he may have been repaying a favor he owed the Majority Leader, or he may have
hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make a fundraising appearance for him,
or he may have been pressured to vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or by
a flood of constituent mail, or he may have been seeking favorable publicity, or he may have
been reluctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill, or he may
have been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed the bill, or he may have been
mad at his wife who opposed the bill, or he may have been intoxicated and utterly
unmotivated when the vote was called, or he may have accidentally voted 'yes' instead of
'no' or, of course, he may have had (and very likely did have) a combination of some of the
above and many other motivations. To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator
is probably to look for something that does not exist.72
Motive-based inquiry-as the Court recognized in O'Brien, Justice Scalia has
observed, and critics of equal protection thinking have emphasized-is an unprofit-
able constitutional exercise.
Straightforward application of an effect test would make the establishment
clause a virtually impenetrable barrier. Absent government assistance, for instance,
religious institutions would have to underwrite programs entirely on their own, and
some parents would be priced out of a private school option for their children.
Invariably, government subsidization and services free religious funds and energies
to advance sectarian purposes, enables sectarian organizations to redirect limited
funds to programs that directly advance their mission, and facilitates the accessibility
of religious activities and enterprises to the public. The Court has refrained from
constructing an uncompromising effect test. Instead, the Court has considered the
primary effect of government action73 and, at times, has transformed the inquiry into
an assessment of whether the state might be perceived as endorsing religion.74
Even pursuant to a diluted standard, the Court in the Kendrick case professed
difficulty in discerning "whether the primary effect of the challenged statute is
impermissible."75 The Court then drew a not so obvious parallel to cases tending to
70. The prevailing concern is that a solitary focus upon discriminatory effect would endanger so many enactments
that the legislative process would be hostage to equal protection dogma. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249 n.
14 (1976).
71. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2605 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2605-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
73. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2571 (1988).
74. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984).
75. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2571.
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discount concern over unlawful effect. The Court relied heavily on college funding
cases, which focus on the diminished religious emphasis of tertiary institutions and
intellectual maturity of students, 76 and determined that AFLA assistance was
comparable to such financing. 77 The chosen analogy is problematical to the extent
ample and even more persuasive precedent exists for a contrary result. Insofar as aid
recipients have editorial control over information they disseminate pursuant to public
funding, the Court normally has found an impermissible effect of advancing religion.
Although provision of secular textbooks 78 or administration of state-prepared
examinations79 has been permitted, funding for instructional materials 80 or tests8'
prepared by sectarian schools have been disallowed. To the extent aid is channeled to
religious agencies propounding theological messages on human reproduction and
related matters, 82 case law provides clear reference points for an establishment clause
violation.
Characterizations of religious colleges, as being not "pervasively sectarian" 83
and having students who "are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination,"- 84 were critical for allowing support that would not have been
countenanced at the secondary level. It is puzzling, therefore, that the Court found
religious counseling services to young adolescents more akin to the college rather
than primary or secondary school line of cases. 85 The AFLA unquestionably enables
religious authorities to select counselors and curricula for the purpose of influencing
impressionable young minds on matters of religious dogma. 86 A highly defensible
conclusion, contrary to the Court's, could rest upon the realization that "[t]ime and
again we have recognized the difficulties inherent in asking even the best-intentioned
individuals in such positions to make 'a total separation between secular teaching and
religious doctrine.'" 87 Strong precedent exists for a conclusion that government
action may be unconstitutional, whether or not it actually promotes religion, so long
as it presents a significant risk of doing so.88
The dubious nature of the Court's analysis is compounded further by the nature
of the activity being subsidized. Although it may be permissible to have a cleric
perform a secular function, 89 "[tihere is a very real and important difference between
running a soup kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to
76. See id. at 2575.
77. Id.
78. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
79. See Wolman v. walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1977).
80. See id. at 250-51.
81. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ.. 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973).
82. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2587-88 n.7 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
686 (1971).
84. Referring to those cases, Justice Blackmun in dissent noted that "[tlhe skepticism of the college student is not
an inconsiderable barrier to any attempt to subvert the congressional objectives and limitations." Kendrick, 108 S. Ct.
at 2589-90 (quoting Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686).
85. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2589-90.
86. Id. at 2588-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2589 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
88. Id. at 2594-95 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
89. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
make the difficult decisions facing them."90 The latter circumstance, characterized
by direct pedagogy, is fraught with considerably more risk of religious
indoctrination. 9' The Court found it "sensible for Congress to recognize that
religious organizations can influence values and can have some influence on family
life.''92 The point perhaps most poignantly evinces how establishment clause
thinking can disregard or miss the central constitutional premise forbidding govern-
ment from underwriting such influence.
Just as easily as the AFLA can be found to have the primary effect of advancing
religion, it may be determined that the program invites an unacceptable degree of
government entanglement. In determining whether entanglement may be excessive,
relevant considerations have included the type of assistance, the nature and purposes
of aid recipients, and the consequent relationship between the state and beneficiary. 93
Insofar as it was possible to fund discrete secular functions of a college or university,
and no extensive auditing or persistent monitoring of the grantee's activities was
necessary, the Court upheld such assistance. 94 Allocation of funds to religious
agencies engaged in counseling and instruction, however, requires more than the
minimal review necessary to ensure that buildings are devoted to secular purposes. 95
At a minimum, given the educative function of such organizations, disagreements
would seem inevitable with respect to what constitutes a religious message. 96 As with
instructional materials prepared by a religious school, the state's editorial review
function would be a highly intrusive one. 97 Again, therefore, ample and compelling
authority exists for a decision contrary to the one reached by the Court.
One of the most troubling aspects of the excessive entanglement test is the
Court's recognition of its functional inadequacy but abiding reliance upon it.
Supervision of funding is essential to ensure that government aid does not promote
religion. Monitoring, however, amounts to entanglement that must be especially
vigilant when impressionable adolescents may be exposed to religious indoctrination.
Although the entanglement standard thus operates in conditions that undercut its
viability if not straightforwardly applied, the Court persists in its utilization.
Combined with the purpose and effect standards, it leaves the Court vulnerable to
suspicion that it may be concerned more with convenient than principled results.
90. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2591 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. "For some religious organizations, the answer to a teenager's question 'Why shouldn't I have an abortion' or
'Why shouldn't I use barrier contraceptives?' will undoubtedly be different from an answer based solely on secular
considerations." Id.
92. Id. at 2573.
93. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971).
94. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
95. Because religious counselors are not doctrinally neutral, enhanced monitoring procedures would be required to
ensure that assistance does not underwrite religious instruction. See id. at 687-88.
96. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2591.
97. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-62
(1975).
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III. NEW DOGMA AND FALSE PROPHECIES
Despite the patent inadequacies of contemporary establishment clause analysis,
the Court largely remains addicted to its treacheries. Although the Court describes the
three-part test as merely a useful guide rather than as a fixed standard, 98 it seldom,
if ever, has deviated from it.99 The abysmal state of establishment clause review
notwithstanding, doctrinal alternatives advanced so far are no more appealing.
Former Chief Justice Burger's "accommodation" focus, which has been test-
marketed in at least two instances, 10 0 and Chief Justice Rehnquist's revisionist
notions regarding the wall between church and state, suffer respectively from flawed
execution and conception. Moreover, neither alternative affords reason for optimism
that it would forge a solid link now missing between establishment clause values and
establishment clause judgment.
The accommodation principle first emerged as a basis for upholding a state
legislature's practice of opening each session with a prayer by a state-paid
chaplain.' 0 ' The Court, in Marsh v. Chambers, E02 concluded that such invocations
were "simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people
of this country."' 03 Had the traditional three-part test been rigorously applied, as
Justice Brennan and others have noted, the practice could not have survived. 104
Instead of firmly applying the purpose, effect, and entanglement standards, the Court
considered the well-established use and traditional acceptance of legislative prayer. 105
Given what it perceived to be a historically well-rooted exercise, the Court concluded
that an otherwise constitutionally vulnerable custom was permissible. ' 06
Historical inquiry is a relevant consideration in determining the scope and
meaning of any fundamental guarantee. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed in
challenging prevailing establishment clause wisdom, however, "[i]t is impossible to
build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional
history."' 0 7 Historical reference points used to support accommodation, if not
entirely inaccurate, at least omit material parts of the record. James Madison, who,
as chief architect of the establishment clause, is routinely adverted to in connection
with any proposed theory of review, 08 considered directly whether "appointment of
Chaplains to the two houses of Congress [is] consistent with the Constitution, and
98. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
99. The Court has asserted that the test was not "relevant" or "useful" in two cases. Id. In fact, the Court applied
it as an alternative, if not the traditional standard of review, in one of those cases. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
251-53 (1982).
100. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
101. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
102. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
103. Id. at 792.
104. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. The Court noted that "'[t]he opening of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply
embedded in the history and tradition of this country. From colonial times through the founding of the Republic and ever
since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom." Id.
at 786.
106. Id. at 793.
107. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., id.
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with the pure principles of religious freedom."a 9 Responding precisely to the issue
confronted by the Court in the Marsh case, Madison concluded that "[i]n strictness
the answer on both points must be in the negative .... The law appointing Chaplains
establishes a religious worship for the national representatives, to be performed by
Ministers of religion, elected by a majority of them; and those are to be paid out of
the national taxes."' 10
Madison's observations contribute to a record which, when considered more
broadly, offers less than unqualified support for legislative prayer. Selective
interpretation is a danger of any historical probing and, because it is so easily
identified and controverted, subverts the very doctrine that it begets. Advertence to
custom and tradition alone is a dubious basis, moreover, upon which to rest
constitutional judgment. The existence and legacy of slavery and segregation testify
to the potential treachery of such reference points when employed as a substitute for
more dynamic reasoning. " Selective and heavy emphasis upon convention is doubly
disquieting, given the first amendment's general concern for protecting diverse
sentiments and sensitivities against dominant assumptions and practices." 2
Despite the divergent instructions of history and perils of charting first
amendment perimeters consonant with majoritarian inclinations, the Court has moved
ahead with such analysis. Soon after approving legislative prayer, the Court evaluated
a government-sponsored nativity scene in light of "an unbroken history of official
acknowledgement by all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life from at least 1789.'' 1 3 In Lynch v. Donnelly, 14 the Court upheld a
municipality's subsidization and maintenance of the display." 5 The Court's historical
claims, however, were even less pertinent and compelling than in the Marsh case.
The Court noted President Washington's and Congress' declaration of Thanksgiving
as a national holiday, the presence of chaplains in the military, displays of religious
art in public art galleries, and presidential and congressional proclamations on behalf
of religious groups." 6 Although offered as "evidence of accommodation of all
faiths,""i 7 the Court's recitation, unlike with legislative prayer, did not include an
established record of the contested practice. Resort to analogy trivialized the creche
to the level of a mere art exhibit and engendered a weak judgment.
Compelling reasons exist for abandoning present establishment clause
precepts,"18 but accommodation concepts should not be looked to as a replacement
standard of general utility. As employed so far, it is poorly calibrated toward the
109. A. STOKES & L. PFEFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 346-47 (1964).
110. Id.
111. Both slavery and official segregation were justified by reference to "established usages, customs and
traditions." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-08
(1857).
112. See infra notes 120-22, 160-61 and accompanying text.
113. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984).
114. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
115. Id. at 671, 687.
116. Id. at 676-77.
117. Id. at 677-78.
118. See supra notes 56-97 and accompanying text; infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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concerns of religious pluralism that are central to the establishment clause. In
concluding that the "display of the creche [was] no more an advancement or
endorsement of religion [than] . . . the exhibition . . . of religious paintings in
governmentally supported [museums],"119 the Court revealed the difficulty of
determining where accommodation ends and endorsement begins. It also evinced a
state of mind akin to the "acute ethnocentric myopia" that sometimes diminishes its
sensitivity toward the nation's pluralistic fabric. 1 20 An "inability to appreciate that in
our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently
from the Members of this Court," 12 1 for instance, has accounted for a difficulty in
discerning constitutional value in expression it finds offensive. Depiction of a creche
as a traditional and essentially secular element of a holiday celebration demonstrates
no acuity for how a nativity scene might be offensive for those whose religious
heritage, if any, is not Christian or the object of government lavishment or attention.
Review that fails to comprehend how minority interests may be affronted by such
majoritarian insensitivity is at least as "depressing" as judgment reflecting a
dominant culture's distaste for minority inclinations or ways. 22
Although accommodation principles so far have only augmented the traditional
purpose, effect, and entanglement test, Chief Justice Rehnquist proposes a radical
conceptual overhaul that would entirely displace it. Rehnquist asserts that the
metaphorical "wall of separation between church and state,"' 23 to which the Court
has referred for over a century, 124 is a "misguided analytical concept." 25 Rehnquist
would abandon the partition imagery altogether and declare that the first amendment
prohibits only the establishment of a national religion and perhaps discrimination
among denominations. 126 Because that interpretation would not require government
neutrality between religion and irreligion,127 government would be free to aid all
sects evenhandedly. 28
The Rehnquist formula, if embraced by the Court, would alter dramatically the
pertinent constitutional landscape. Government aid to parochial schools, for instance,
would be permissible regardless of its potential for political divisiveness. 29 Although
119. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
120. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726. 776-77 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The opinion in Pacifica
was criticized for, among other things, attaching less first amendment value to expression that, although offensive to some




123. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. More then a century ago, the Court observed that "'li]n the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state.'" Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
125. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106. Rehnquist asserts that the notion "illustrates all too well the wisdom of Benjamin
Cardozo's observation that 'Imletaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it." Id. at 107 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926)).
126. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Although rejecting the potential for political divisiveness as a general focal point, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 684 (1984), the Court has considered it pertinent when direct financial subsidies of religious activities are at
issue. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n. 11 (1983).
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not expressly stated in Rehnquist's authoring of the Kendrick opinion, a sense that the
danger of a national religion was not created and neutrality was not compromised may
have made it easier to dismiss seemingly difficult effect and entanglement prob-
lems. ' 30 Absent similar concern, prayer that did not favor a particular sect would be
countenanced even if the consequence of overt legislative purpose.1 3' Presumably, a
nativity scene would be constitutional, subject arguably to other religions being
afforded a comparable opportunity to have their heritage displayed. 32
Rehnquist's revisionist notions represent the outgrowth of an equally revisionist
reading of history. His conclusions flow from an assault upon Thomas Jefferson's
"wall of separation" metaphor, which he discounts as a minor afterthought
communicated to a church congregation fourteen years after the first amendment was
framed. 33 Because Jefferson was in France when the Bill of Rights was being
devised, Rehnquist further dismisses him as a "less than ideal source of contempo-
rary history as to the meaning of the Establishment Clause."' 134 Having deprecated
Jefferson's contributions, the Chief Justice turns to James Madison whom he
characterizes as having been the key draftsman and having had a different constitu-
tional purpose in mind. 35 Based upon Madison's compositions, revisions, and House
Service in 1789, Rehnquist asserts that the first amendment merely prohibits
establishment of a national religion and perhaps sectarian discrimination. 136
The exclusive focus upon Madison is troublesome because interpretations of his
drafting designs, influenced by the need to elicit broad-based support for his work,
are not indisputable. Reliance upon one authority, even if it is a prominent one,
presumes that Madison's views were consensually subscribed to and thus makes an
elementary mistake common in efforts to discern original intent. Identification of a
singular understanding of or design for the establishment clause is as illusory an
exercise as fathoming the collective intent of any deliberative body. 137 Delegates to
the Constitutional Convention, like the states which ratified the first amendment,
supported the establishment clause for diverse reasons. Some delegates and states saw
it as a means for protecting established state religions against federal interference.1 38
A few supported the provision as a mechanism for ensuring religious tolerance.139
130. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2573 (1988).
131. From the premise that the establishment clause does not require neutrality between religion and irreligion,
Rehnquist concluded that "[niothing in . . the First Amendment, properly understood, prohibits [the state's] general
'endorsement' or prayer." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985).
132. Such a conclusion would transcend the Court's determination, on free speech grounds, that a religious group
may not be denied access to a forum generally available to the public. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 281 (1981).
133. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 113.
137. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text; infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
138. South Carolina, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, and New Hampshire all had established churches
which, when the first amendment was adopted, they wished to protect from federal interference. See I A. STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1950).
139. Colonial Pennsylvania was founded upon the notion that ethnic and religious diversity was desirable. See R.
DIVINE, T. BREEN, G. FREDERICKSON & R. WILUAMS, AMERICA PAST AND PRESENT 54-55 (1987). Even so, rights and
liberties were restricted to those professing faith in a Christian religion. See id. at 55. Although the Pennsylvania model
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Still other states favored it as a device that would keep government and religious
affairs separate.140 Madison and Jefferson were veteran champions of the separatist
movement. Shortly before the Constitutional Convention, they had composed
Virginia's guarantee of church and state separation, which emphatically prohibited
government subsidization of religious activity.' 4' Such separatist works are more
consonant with establishing and maintaining than tearing down a wall between church
and state. Public financing of religious activities, which Rehnquist would permit on
a nondiscriminatory basis, is precisely what Madison sought to preclude in Virginia.
Even if Jefferson was not a direct participant in the Constitutional Convention, and
Madison harbored or accommodated some divergent views there, separatist thought
was well represented and should not be selectively disregarded two centuries later.
Strangely enough, Rehnquist himself has acknowledged the deficiencies of
motive-based inquiry. The Chief Justice has noted the futility of discerning a single
"actual purpose"' 142 and has even criticized the Court for failing to recognize that
legislators support a given bill for varying reasons. 143 He once posed the rhetorical
question of how the Court should identify the actual purpose of a regulation, adopted
by a 40-20 vote, and supported by ten legislators on safety grounds and by ten others
on the basis of protectionism. 44 The unstated but obvious answer was that collective
intent was not just indecipherable but nonexistent. Confronted with a similar question
of how to ascertain the actual purpose of the establishment clause, however,
Rehnquist seems satisfied with the abridged commentary of one source. 45
Although Madison may have been the principal author of the first amendment,
he did not ratify it alone. Even if he had, the characterization of Madison's
substantive sentiments are not incontrovertible. References to Madison's early
writings and actions in the House disregard subsequent reformulation of thought and
confessions of error. In acknowledging that his initial approval of House chaplains
was mistaken, Madison asserted that "[i]f Religion consists in voluntary acts of
individuals, singly or voluntarily associated, and [if] it be proper that public
functionaries, as well as their constituents should discharge their duties, but let them
like their constituents, do so at their own expense."' 146 Later, as president, Madison
vetoed a land grant to a church because it "comprise[d] a principle and precedent for
the appropriation of funds of the United States, for the use and support of religious
comes closest to supporting an establishment clause theory that precludes only denominational discrimination, it in fact
favored Christianity over other religions. See id.
140. Madison and Jefferson strongly opposed intermingling of government and religious affairs and successfully
advocated the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty of 1786. See 2 THE WRrriNGS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 300-03 (A. Bergh
ed. 1905). The Act was a strong separatist work designed especially to preclude public funding of religious activity. See
id.
141. See id.
142. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp.. 450 U.S. 662, 702-03 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Rehnquist
notes that motive-based inquiry consistently has been rejected by the Court in other contexts and should not be used in
dormant commerce power analysis).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 703.
145. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985).
146. I A. STOKES, supra note 138.
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societies contrary to the establishment clause."1 47 He also spoke forcefully against
employment of "Religion [generally] as an engine of Civil Policy." 48
Such remonstrances are improbable antecedents for wholesale discounting of
pluralistic concerns associated with conclusions that the establishment clause merely
prohibits imposition of an official religion and possibly sectarian discrimination.
They speak much more strongly toward reinforcement rather than leveling of the wall
between church and state. Although some of Madison's most trenchant observations
may reflect afterthought and hindsight, those are significant benefits which enlight-
ened review should not discount or dismiss. Inquiries into original meaning would be
retarded if allowed to consider only the theoretical expectations and not the practical
observations of the framers.
Constitutional interests are not well served when principle emerges primarily
from a competition among favorite versions of history. Searches for original intent
run a significant risk of devolving into identification of the most serviceable purpose.
Emphasis upon the aims of one framer, or even of the entire assemblage of
constitutional architects, also risks investment in a manifestly imperfect body 149 and
guesswork, while discounting the ability of subsequent generations to engage in a
critical aspect of self-governance. Setting contemporary establishment clause stan-
dards in accordance with pre-ratification contemplations is akin to tying modern
equal protection precepts to expectations of the fourteenth amendment's framers, who
did not anticipate abolition of segregation.
To the extent early wisdom and perceptions are relevant, full disclosure of them
requires reference to the history of Article VI of the Constitution. That provision
prohibits any "religious test [from being] ... required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under the United States." 5 0 Although not affording the capacious
religious guarantees of the first amendment, Article VI is noteworthy for revealing a
contemporaneous state of mind that was sensitive to irreligion and is omitted from
Rehnquist's historical narrative.
Heavy or exclusive emphasis upon framers' intent also obscures or disregards
the reality that significant constitutional values and law have evolved from experience
rather than original contemplation. Whatever instructions are afforded by the drafting
and ratification of the establishment clause have been augmented, over the course of
time, by the lesson that a diverse society remains pluralistically viable only if it
honors its diversity. '5' Appreciation of that reality is essential toward ensuring that a
147. 22 ANNALS OF CONREsS 1098 (1811).
148. 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301-02 (1973).
149. Many of the fourteenth amendment's architects, for instance, considered liberty of contract as the key to equal
protection and in no way contemplated desegregation. See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 46 (1985).
Original imperfection is evidenced by, among other things, irresoluteness in addressing the slavery issue.
150. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
151. Comprehensive neutrality reflects:
recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental
and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the
State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenents of one or of all orthodoxies.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). A similar sensitivity to the need to read the establishment
clause in light of a pluralistic society is evident in the Court's expansion of statutory grounds for conscientious objector
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person's standing in the political community is unaffected by his or her religiosity or
lack thereof. If not indubitably prescribed by the works of Madison or others, the
continued factoring of irreligion concerns into establishment clause review is
consistent with respect for a culturally pluralistic order.
IV. CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE PATH TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION
It is unrealistic to expect any constitutional standard to beget results that are
immune to controversy or criticism. The failings of the purpose, effect, and
entanglement test, however, are well beyond normal margins of tolerance. Existing
criteria have bred incurably fractured plurality opinions and proved inadequate for
deciding issues in a principled fashion.152 It is an accurate observation that the "wall
of separation" has deteriorated into a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier" that
is only "dimly perceived." 5 3 That degeneration, however, is less a justification for
total destruction than a justification for rehabilitation. The wall has decayed, not
because it lacks structural integrity, but primarily from neglect. Establishment clause
standards do not always bear a visible relationship to establishment clause values and
are poorly conceived for maintenance purposes. The purpose element, in particular,
seems little more than an impertinent jurisprudential import with minimal utility in
any first amendment zone.' 54 Ultimate responsibility for analytical mischief and
inconsistent division of government and religious affairs rests with the Court which,
even when setting pertinent standards, has evinced a failure of will or lack of
sensitivity in applying them. The wall between church and state consequently has
been eroded by majoritarianism and subjectivism into its present disreputable state as
a semi-permeable barrier that is vulnerable to dominant and orthodox impulses.
Proposals to tear down the wall altogether and thereby remove it permanently
from the first amendment's lexicon coincide with suggestions that the concerns which
originally prompted the establishment clause largely have dissipated. 155 Such
intimations seem seriously detached from contemporary political realities which are
characterized by notable actual and potential insinuations of religion into government
and vice-versa. Modern touching of establishment clause nerves include a major
political party's resolution declaring the United States "a Christian nation" 5 6 and
moral controversies such as abortion that mix heavy doses of religion and politics. 157
Evangelism inspired a prominent candidacy in the most recent presidential primaries
and has channeled its energies into organizing and maintaining powerful political
status so that they included not only religious but political, sociological, philosophical, and moral beliefs. See Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1970).
152. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668. 676 (1984).
154. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,629 (1978); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,263 (1977) (Powell,
J., concurring).
156. Newsweek, Feb. 27, 1989, at 5, col. 4 (resolution by Arizona Republican Party).
157. An argument that federal restrictions upon publicly funded abortions violated the establishment clause, because
they advanced church policies, was rejected by the Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The Court determined
that the relationship between church and state policy was merely coincidental. Id. at 319-20.
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lobbies. Religious activism comes at a time when the political system is increasingly
susceptible to the importunes of special interest groups. 158 The force and influence of
political action committees, whose concerns transcend the particularized interests of
a given district, have disrupted traditional norms of electoral accountability. Such
actualities and trends further militate toward fortification rather than demolition of the
wall between church and state.
Improvement in establishment clause standards of review must proceed from an
analytical departure point calibrated more carefully toward the overarching aims of
the first amendment. The multiple but associated elements of that guarantee, encasing
freedom of religion, press, speech, association,159 and rights to assemble peaceably
and petition for redress of grievances, 160 collectively represent society's valuation of
individual dignity, conscience, and difference. A central premise of existing
establishment clause review is that "[w]e are a religious people.' ' 61 That calcula-
tion, however, too often steers analysis toward majoritarian preferences and
orthodoxy and away from the interests of diversity. A better originating point, more
visibly tied to pluralistic values, is that "we are a diverse people."
Abiding concerns for analysis that seeks to conform establishment clause
principles with transcendent first amendment values are essentially twofold. Religion
should be irrelevant to political standing and religious support or association should
not be coerced. Proper attention to those interests does not require the total
elimination of existing criteria for review. It necessitates a restructuring of those
standards which are pertinent, however, and their integration with precepts that
would fasten toward heterodox rather than orthodox sensitivity.
The possibility of excessive entanglement is a legitimate focal point of
establishment clause review. Although it is the last of the elements to be incorporated
into the existing three-part test, 162 it is probably the most relevant. Ensuring that the
affairs of government and religion do not become ensnared serves pluralism in two
ways. When government becomes insinuated in the propagation of a religious
message or agenda, those who subscribe to another denomination or other religion
may be affronted and belittled. Administrative entanglement makes creed vulnerable
to official promptings and thus endangers religious autonomy and pluralism. In its
present incarnation, the entanglement test has failed to confront satisfactorily the
snarling of official action both with religious heritage and operations.
That remissness, as noted before, reflects dereliction both in doctrinal execution
and linkage to pluralistic values. The Kendrick, 163 Lynch, 164 and Chambers165 cases
each presented major entanglement problems. Standards were relaxed, however, and
158. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. Freedom of association has been inferred from enumerated freedoms of speech and assembly. See NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
160. U.S. CONSr., amend. I.
161. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
162. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
163. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988), discussed at supra notes 55-97 and accompanying text.
164. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), discussed at supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
165. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), discussed at supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
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diversity interests derogated. The funding of Catholic agencies providing advice to
adolescents on abortion and pregnancy, as noted previously,1 66 provides a classic
problem of administrative entanglement. Official nativity exhibits and legislative
prayer connote alignment of government with orthodox rather than pluralistic
ideals. ' 67 It may be argued that such action benefits diversity, because it facilitates the
free exercise of religion. Abetment of that nature, however, elevates and benefits the
religious interests of only one segment of the citizenry. Official recusal would neither
favor nor, because private expressions of faith would not be precluded, constitution-
ally burden anyone. At least when free exercise interests are not seriously immobi-
lized, therefore, official noninvolvement would seem generally prudent.
Sometimes related to but nonetheless separate from entanglement is the
possibility that government action may be politically divisive. The potential for
discord is a highly probative consideration but a factor which the Court generally has
shied away from examining. Given the especially close relationship between
religious-political dissonance and the reason for the existence of the establishment
clause, the Court's reluctance to examine divisive potential is mystifying. For the
most part, it has brushed off the possibility of such an inquiry in conclusory terns.16 8
Protestations that such an evaluation would be speculative, 169 or should be confined
to instances of direct government funding, 170 disregard or undervalue its utility. They
also forget that the Court routinely engages in much more conjectural exercises,
sometimes even to curtail rather than enhance or vindicate constitutional interests. '7'
The pursuit of motive-based inquiry is an especially prominent exercise in speculation
and vanity, which already infects establishment clause analysis and is central to equal
protection 72 and state police power review. 173
Inquiry into potential divisiveness requires less speculation than sensitivity
toward social reality and pluralistic values. Discernment of adverse consequences
from government action is the analytical process responsible for determining, for
instance, that official segregation was harmful and thus constitutionally
intolerable. 174 As it did in examining laws that favored the majority race, the Court
need only ascertain whether official ways or enactments convenience a dominant
culture at the expense of a minority. Contrary professions notwithstanding, the Court
is not incompetent or unpracticed with respect to identifying the divisive nature and
consequence of government action and then factoring them into constitutional law.
Such an analytical methodology would be incidentally useful in addressing some of
166. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
168. See Mueller v. Allen. 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n. 11 (1983).
169, See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403-04 n.ll.
171. "From the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various comprovable
assumptions." Paris Adult Theaterv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973). Obscenity has been prohibited and first amendment
freedom accordingly circumscribed, for instance, pursuant to the presumption that it is harmful. See generally Paris Adult
Theatre. 413 U.S. at 49.
172. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
173. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 677 (1981).
174. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483. 493-95 (1954).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's neutrality concerns, 75 but would account for them in a
more pluralistically sensitive fashion. Sectarian discrimination 76 might present
enough of a likelihood of dissonance, for instance, that such favoritism would
constitute a presumptive first amendment violation.' 77
A hard focus upon entanglement and searching inquiry into divisive potential
would not invariably negate every relationship between government and religion.
A6commodation concepts might afford an analytical predicate for sensitively
inquiring into societal values pertinent to shaping establishment clause parameters
and avoiding wooden or unreasonable results. To function properly and effectively,
however, such notions must advance pluralistic values rather than swallow them.
When government is responsible for a burden that otherwise would be imposed on the
free exercise of religion, accommodation is a pertinent recourse. It satisfactorily
justifies, for instance, official provision of military chaplains. Because of their unique
relationship with the state, and consequent problems of religious access resulting
from location and service, military personnel might be denied access to organized
religion unless the government affirmatively afforded the opportunity. 178 Notions of
accommodation also are at the core of constitutional respect for personal conscience
that may conflict with officially imposed obligations. 179
Accommodation thus may be a serviceable principle when government action or
expectations would impair religious exercise or burden belief. It would not support
school prayer, official religious displays, or any other practice that is or should be
subject to constitutional rather than governmental disability. Regardless of any
establishment clause prohibition of such exercises, individuals are not impaired with
respect to the capacity for prayer or profession on their own private terms. An interest
in extending the opportunity, with the consequence that competing beliefs or
nonbeliefs may be implicated or disadvantaged, is not congruent with or comparable
to having an officially reduced opportunity for the exercise of faith. Accommodation
may be used to remedy government-induced impediments, but should not be a device
for facilitation in the absence of official responsibility for those circumstances.
The concept of accommodation thus is a principle of limited utility that is most
useful when no potential exists for coerced or unwanted religious association. If the
concept is to be stretched any further, its outer limits should not countenance
practices without well-established historical support and unequivocal contemporary
acquiescence. Legislative prayer might qualify pursuant to such an exception, given
its well-established nature and if objections are truly unappreciable. Still, irreligion
should merit enough respect in a pluralistic order to necessitate an inquiry into less
burdensome alternatives. Consideration might run to pre-session invocations, a
general moment of silence that facilitates pluralistic thought, and contemplation of
175. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
176. Contrary to Rehnquist's notion that the state is prohibited only from sectarian discrimination, however,
pluralism concerns militate against favoritism of religion or irreligion.
177. See generally Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 248 (1982).
178. Compulsory chapel requirements, in contrast, would be coercive and thus unconstitutional. See Anderson v.
Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
179. See generally Velsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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other options that would enable consenting individuals to address their spiritual
needs.
Also fitting within an exception to the common establishment clause rule might
be religious references on coinage, which do not extract an individual endorsement.
Compulsory pledges of allegiance to "one nation under God" or their equivalent,
regardless of how supported by tradition, coerce rather than accommodate and
accordingly should have no constitutional support. ' 8 0 Public schools do not have the
longevity of legislatures or coinage. ' 8' They are not a fitting place for religion, in any
event, because schools are well-established venues for conflict between official
compulsion and individual autonomy. 82 Accommodation of free exercise interests
may reflect a worthy governmental purpose, but not beyond a point at which it
becomes discernible as coercion or begets conflict or disorder. When conceived
essentially by majoritarian impulses, first amendment standards tend to be misbegot-
ten. When used primarily to satisfy majoritarian expectations, first amendment
interests are mismanaged.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court often has lamented the difficulty of drawing necessary lines in the
establishment clause area. The charting of constitutional contours generally, how-
ever, is a challenging exercise. It becomes more perilous when principle becomes
visibly detached from underlying value. Modern establishment clause analysis at its
worst fits into a jurisprudential legacy characterized by a dominant culture's
impositions or insensitivities. The futility of contemporary establishment clause
analysis was further evinced, as this article went to print, by the micromanagement
of seasonal religious displays in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.' 83 The Court
approved exhibition of a menorah outside a city-county building, but disallowed a
nativity scene on the inside. ' 84 The good news is that four justices appear to favor an
overhaul of establishment clause standards. ' 8 5 The bad news is that they would veer
further from the imperitives of cultural pluralism.' 86 Constitutional life would be
much simplified and the quality of review better enhanced if the establishment clause
were more seriously and consistently regarded as an integrated thread in the first
amendment's broad pluralistic weave.
180. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
181. Public education is largely a phenomenon of the past century. See L. TRIBE, supra note 149.
182. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible readings and prayer); Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (pledge of allegiance); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (restrictions on
teaching foreign language).
183. 57 U.S.L.W. 5045 (U.S. July 3, 1989).
184. Id. at 5052-53, 5057.
185. Id. at 5067.
186. The revised focus would entail a majoritarian weighted consideration of whether government coerced support
of or participation in religion or provided direct benefits that established or tended to establish a state religion. Id. at 5068
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).

